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CYBER SECURITY OF TOMORROW & PERSONAL 
DATA OF YESTERDAY
by
JAKUB HARAŠTA*
This paper aims to present new strategies of maintaining security that are powered  
by the (big) data. In its first part, the paper introduces the general idea of the big  
data analysis being used to empower security while stating obvious lack of progress  
in the data protection legislation. In its second part, the paper presents standard  
perimeter-based security and cyber security and, based on the available literature,  
states that it disproportionately enhances risks for computer systems. In its third  
part, the paper provides an overview of the intelligence-driven security, which is  
largely understood by the industry as the only way to maintain security facing ad-
vanced persistent threats. The last part briefly discusses possible outcome of func-
tional separation, which protects the privacy, but renders big data for the purpose of  
security almost useless. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace1 written by John Perry Bar-
low in 1996 became, despite its obvious lack of legal force, a rather influen-
tial  document  and is  often quoted by scholars  and internet-liberalists.  It 
sums up the general unwillingness of cyberspace to succumb to the ‘weary 
giants of flesh and steel’, as Barlow understood the world outside the cyber-
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1 Barlow, J. P. 1996, ‘A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace’, viewed 22 December 
2013, <https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html>.
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space  and outside  its  immense  freedom of  mind.  On the  other  hand,  A 
Cypherpunk’s manifesto2 written in 1993 by Eric Hughes remains largely 
unknown  and  unnoticed  despite  its  similarly  interesting  nature.  It  suc-
ceeded to precisely describe the information society we are currently living 
in. The basic motto of the Cypherpunk movement arose from the manifesto 
–  cypherpunks write code.  The Cypherpunk movement became increasingly 
famous when an article Crypto Rebels3 written by Steven Levy appeared in 
one of the first issues of the magazine Wired. The article itself was not an as-
tonishing piece of literature, yet it asked its audience the same question as 
this paper: Whether privacy will exist in the 21st century.
Cyber security is becoming increasingly important as societies have been 
growing  dependent  on  critical  information  infrastructures,  but  as  Adi 
Shamir, the co-inventor of the RSA algorithm, correctly points out, even the 
most secure systems can be penetrated by advanced persistent threats4. In 
fact, we have witnessed such systems to fail.5 The general approach of vari-
ous law enforcement agencies and intelligence services requiring a system 
administrator to implement backdoors in order to ease the acquisition of in-
formation6 not only leads to surveillance and violation of human rights, but 
also to cyber insecurity. Every system, no matter how secure against the cy-
ber threats, can be exploited. Construing backdoors in order to allow sur-
veillance and intelligence gathering for the sake of security creates addition-
al security risks. Therefore, a proactive cyber defence and intelligence-driv-
en cyber security are both becoming increasingly important as well. A big 
data analysis,  as one of the key aspects of intelligence-driven security, is 
what also allows ubiquitous surveillance without compromising the secur-
ity by installing backdoors. Undeniably, data, information and knowledge 
are what fuels today’s world. The privacy is going to face new challenges in 
massive use of big data, because the concept of big data is beneficial when 
facing advanced persistent threats. The privacy and data protection of yes-
2 Hughes, E. 1993, ‘A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto’, viewed 22 December 2013, <http://www.act-
ivism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html>.
3 Levy,  S.  1993,  ‘Crypto  Rebels’,  Wired,  vol.  1,  no.  2,  viewed  22  December  2013, 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.02/crypto.rebels.html>.
4 Fisher, D. 2013.  ‘RSA Conference 2013: Experts say it’s time to prepare for a post-crypto 
world’,  threatpost,  viewed 22 December 2013,  <http://threatpost.com/rsa-conference-2013-
experts-say-its-time-prepare-post-crypto-world-022613/77565>.
5 For example Stuxnet. 
6 Landau, S. E. 2010, Surveillance or Security?: the risks posed by new wiretapping technolo-
gies, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. P. 34
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terday has been struggling, unable to cope with personal data being system-
atically used as a resource to propel the security towards the world of to-
morrow.
2. WIRE-TAPPING, SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY
The  basic  assumption  of  cypherpunks  is  that  someone  else  beside  the 
sender and the intended receiver always consumes an unencrypted commu-
nication. This might seemed overly paranoid back then, but today with the 
PRISM revelation, even the greatest sceptics realised that this assumption 
actually might have been correct. Privacy (as a distributive right) was ex-
ploited in  the  past  in  order  to  strengthen security  (as  a non-distributive  
right or public good) mainly within various totalitarian regimes.7 However, 
after 9/11 the discussion about the possible dichotomy of freedom and se-
curity emerged even in Western Europe and mainly in the USA itself.  8 It is 
an indisputable fact that collecting data and information has a huge poten-
tial to benefit security.9 In today’s globalised and interconnected world full 
of asymmetrical  threats,  this purpose is  legitimate.  Therefore, within this 
environment it is increasingly more difficult to maintain one’s privacy or 
data integrity.
Cyber security consists of three cornerstone properties. Confidentiality, 
integrity and availability are forming the CIA triad.10 This concept is insuffi-
cient to maintain high standard of security and has to be further specified 
by various  corporate,  national  or  international  policies  or  by  legislation. 
However,  it is preconceptions and general understanding of the society in 
the  centralised  world  what  ties  these  tools.  The  post-modern  nature  of 
today’s world and the evasive nature of cyberspace remain largely unreflec-
7 Bobek, M., Molek, P., Šimíček, V. 2009, Komunistické právo v Československu: Kapitoly z 
dějin bezpráví, Masarykova univerzita, Brno. Pp. 330-363.
8 See for example Isanga, J. M. 2009, ‘Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Emergence 
of a Rule of Customary International Law from United Nations Resolutions’, Denver Journ-
al  of  International  Law  and  Policy,  vol.  37,  no.  2,  pp.  223-255,  viewed  15  June  2013, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2093414>.
Some authors suggest that this discussion was always present but due to relatively peaceful 
environment largely supressed. See LANDAU 2010.
9 As evidenced by existence of various intelligence services around the world.
10 See Graham, J.,  Howard, R.,  Olson, R.  2011,  Cyber Security  Essentials,  CRC Press,  Boca 
Raton.
For more security properties tied up to CIA triad see also Hsu, F. D., Marinucci, D. 2013, 
Advances in Cyber Security, Fordham University Press, New York. Pp. 41-42.
Alternative to CIA triad is Parkerian Hexad, see Bosworth, S., Kabay, M. E. 2002, Computer 
Security Handbook, John Wiley & sons, Hoboken. Pp. 116-136.
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ted. New threats require new defensive mechanisms and these mechanisms 
require data. 
When the Internet was designed, the main focus was targeted toward its  
functionality and not toward the security of its users.11 Therefore, adversar-
ies are able to exploit this mobile and anonymous environment in a manner 
that would have been impossible within the previous public switched tele-
phone networks, which were largely centralised12 and tied to a certain loca-
tion. However, the need of law enforcement agencies and intelligence ser-
vices to obtain some information in order to enhance the security of the so-
ciety13 did not diminish.  Therefore, governments  seek possibilities to em-
bed functionalities allowing surveillance14 in order to achieve a higher level 
of  security.  Unfortunately, the architecture of the Internet makes it  quite 
easy to observe a user’s behaviour online15 while options to find and prosec-
ute  adversaries  are relatively  low.  As such,  the  government  surveillance 
budgets are more likely to cause harm to privacy than to uncover stand-
alone terrorist cells.16 The idea of intentional flaws left in the system archi-
tecture,  so  called  backdoors,  allowing  law  enforcement  agencies,  intelli-
gence services or other groups of interest to observe an otherwise secured 
communication  is  frequently  mentioned  and  even  used.17 On  the  other 
hand,  these  actions  have  also  enhanced  risks  for  the  systems  involved. 
Wire-tapping  under  legal  authorisation  exposes  privacy  for  a  certain 
amount of time and for a certain legitimate purpose. Requests for networks 
to be architected to accommodate authorised wiretaps expose privacy not 
11 See Baran, P. 1964,  ‘On distributed communication: I. Introduction to distributed commu-
nications  networks’,  viewed  10  January  2014,  <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf>.
The original idea was to design a military network so decentralised it could work even after 
a nuclear strike.  ARPANET evolved following this concept, despite it  never were really  
used to military purposes.
12 As opposite to internet which is decentralised in order for information to be possible to by-
pass possible network malfunctions.
13 Through early warning or prosecution.
14 LANDAU 2010, p. 34.
15 Ibid. P. 139.
16 Nagaraja, S. 2008, ‘The Economics of Covert Community Detection and Hiding‘, viewed 8 
January 2014, <http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Nagaraja.pdf>.
17 For recent example see Paganini, P. 2014, ‘French satellites sold to UAE may contain back-
doored  components’,  Security  Affairs,  viewed  8  January  2014,  <http://securityaffairs.co/
wordpress/20980/intelligence/french-satellites-backdoors.html>.
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only to law enforcement agencies but also to various adversaries, therefore 
illegitimately.18
Leaving any intentional flaws in the system for the sake of surveillance 
not only violates the privacy of the users disproportionately, but also opens 
field for advanced persistent threats and therefore further compromises the 
system itself.  Wire-tapping is often discussed only in times of high stress 
without a rational basis which further complicates discussion of the issue 
and causes an inclination towards the use of backdoors.19 However, the dis-
tributive right of privacy is so important that any suspension of communic-
ation privacy must occur only during extreme emergency and for a brief 
period of time,20 which is definitely not fulfilled in the case of permanently 
existing backdoors within the architecture.
To conclude, abovementioned solution is understandably unpopular be-
cause of the enhanced risks and also for the easy access to surveillance that 
might or might not follow the set legal standards, lawful procedures and le-
gitimate purposes. In order to face advanced persistent threats, it needs to 
evolve.  Today’s  world  largely  resembles  the  cyberspace  because  of  the 
asymmetrical threats arising from groups enjoying the current human rights 
standards for malevolent purposes. Law enforcement and intelligence ser-
vices react to this by pushing towards less stringent wire-tapping rules and 
even intentionally built insecurities in some systems. This tendency is also 
present in cyberspace when facing the advanced persistent threats by im-
plementing intelligence-driven security.
3. INTELLIGENCE-DRIVEN SECURITY
Cyber security maintained by traditional means of protection is getting ob-
solete for some of the actors21, mainly because it lingers to the idea of a peri-
meter that needs to be set and protected from outside threats. The idea of a  
18 LANDAU 2010, p. 247. 
See also initiative Necessary & Proportionate at <https://en.necessaryandproportionate.org/
text>.
19 LANDAU, p. 247.
20 Ibid. P. 252.
21 Hutchins, E. M., Cloppert, M. J., Amin, R. M. 2011, ‘Intelligence-Driven Computer Network 
Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains‘, viewed 
30  December  2013,  <http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/corpor-
ate/documents/LM-Whie-Paper-Intel-Driven-Defense.pdf>.
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perimeter does not suffice facing the advanced persistent threats or growing 
zero-day exploit market.22 
Stuxnet, a malware targeted to affect Iran centrifuges for the uranium 
enrichment, is an example of such tailored advanced threat. This malware 
was deployed not only with the unparalleled amount of four zero-day ex-
ploits used,23 but also with the excellent understanding of the network and 
the whole Natanz facility. Information sources showed that the amount of 
the operational uranium enrichment centrifuges significantly dropped and 
the production of enriched uranium stopped several times due to technical 
difficulties.24 The deployment of Stuxnet was an exquisite piece of work pre-
pared allegedly by the USA and Israel. It combined online and offline meas-
ures in order to infect computers that were protected and intentionally kept 
offline.25 Whether Stuxnet was the first sophisticated cyber weapon or not is  
irrelevant,  but  it  undeniably  was  an example  of  an  advanced persistent 
threat. 
Intelligence-driven security is intended to be able to keep these threats 
outside the system or to detect them soon enough to prevent any damage. It 
partially abandons the concept of a perimeter and stands on two assump-
tions to formulate several desirable states to be achieved.
Assumptions can be understood as following: (I) to register an intrusion 
takes an amount of time usually sufficient for an adversary to exploit the 
system and cause harm or benefit from it; (II) if the adversary is about to ex-
ploit the system, they shall sooner or later do something irregular within 
the system that a normally behaving user or program would not do; (III) 
more data means more secure networks.26
A perfect intelligence-driven security model using big data is able to: (I) 
collect data from diverse data sources both inside and outside the organisa-
22 Stockton, P., Golabek-Goldman, M. 2013, ‘Curbing the Market for Cyber Weapons‘, viewed 
28 December 2013, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364658>. P. 102. 
Also Curry, S., Kirda, E., Schwartz, E., Stewart, W. H., Yoran, A. 2013, ‘Big data fuels intelli-
gence-driven  security‘,  viewed  30  December  2013,  <http://www.emc.com/collateral/in-
dustry-overview/big-data-fuels-intelligence-driven-security-io.pdf>.
23 Murchu, L. O., 2010,‘Stuxnet Using Three Additional Zero-Day Vulnerabilities‘, viewed 15 
December  2013,  <http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-using-three-addition-
al-zero-day-vulnerabilities>.  Also  De  Falco,  M.  2012,  ‘Stuxnet  Facts  Report‘,  CCD  COE, 
Tallinn. P. 8-10.
24 See  Albright,  D.,  Shire,  J.  2009,  ‘IAEA  Report  on  Iran’,  viewed  9  January  2014, 
<http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_Report_16Nov2009.pdf>.
25 Bamford, J. 2013,  ‘The Secret War‘, Wired, viewed 7 December 2013, <http://www.wired.-
com/threatlevel/2013/06/general-keith-alexander-cyberwar/all/>.
26 This assumption is not typical solely for this model. See CURRY 2013, p. 4.
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tion in order to multiply the value of the information obtained; (II) use auto-
mated tools to collect diverse data types and normalize them in order to use 
them by analytical  tools;  (III)  implement  analytical  tools  capable  of  pro-
cessing a vast amount of fast-changing data in real time to produce action-
able information;27 (IV) use advanced monitoring systems to continuously 
examine systems and resources and assess existing risk models; (V) actively 
control the deployment of counter-measures such as an additional user au-
thentication  and  blocking  data  transmission;  (VI)  implement  centralised 
warehouse of all security-related data, (VII) standardise views into indicat-
ors that are created in a machine-readable form so that they can be shared 
with trusted partners; (VIII) implement multiple tier infrastructure to create 
scalability  across  various  vectors  (geography,  storage,  various  databases) 
and to process large searches; (IX) highly integrate security- and risk-man-
agement tools to facilitate detailed investigation.28
By using big data, cyber security can be further enhanced to be able to 
face new threats. This model is fit not only for the sake of cyber security, but  
also for the sake of security in general,  which is  one of the reasons why 
PRISM was enacted. Big data is not unknown to US government,29 but the 
PRISM reached  far unparalleled dimensions of sophistication and size. In-
telligence-driven security in its principles was implemented in order to en-
hance security by a big data analysis. In fact, the PRISM had no other way 
to perform its function. Because of the policy of “three hops”30, the amount 
of data collected reached the size of big data which is unable to be examined 
by traditional means.
Therefore, the use of big data can lead to more secure networks and soci-
eties. However, the data protection legislation which is currently being en-
acted or developed is not reflecting these policies. The most of the current 
27 See also Executive Office of the President. 2013, ‘Report to the President: Immediate Oppor-
tunities for Strengthening the Nation’s Cybersecurity‘, viewed 28 December 2013, Report to 
the  president,  <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/
pcast_cybersecurity_nov-2013.pdf>. P. 13-15.
28 CURRY 2013, p. 5.
29 See Executive  Office  of  the  President.  2012,  ‘Big Data  Across  the Federal  Government‘, 
viewed  8  January  2014,  <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/
big_data_fact_sheet_final_1.pdf>.
30 See Directorate General for Internal Policies. 2013, ‘The US National Security Agency (NSA) 
surveillance programmes (PRISM) and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) activit-
ies  and  their  impact  on  EU  citizens‘  fundamental  rights‘,  viewed  22  December  2013, 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/eu-nsa.pdf>. P. 18.
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data protection laws are based on 1980 OECD guidelines.31 Although these 
were  updated  in  201332,  the new guidelines  plainly  stated that  “the  phe-
nomenon of “big data” (…) may hold great economic and social value, but there  
can be privacy implications.”33 This is barely enough for the sake of under-
standing big data and its impact on privacy and data protection.
4. FUNCTIONAL SEPARATION
Despite the usefulness of big data within the intelligence driven security,  
they pose significant risks for the protection of personal data and the right 
to privacy. The current legislation is largely based on concepts of notice and 
consent. In general, notices are largely ignored and consents are often unin-
formed. Yet, there are regulators clinging to these concepts.34 The concept of 
choice is turning even more obsolete, because the concept of big data analyt-
ics for the purpose of security is even less understandable for the general 
population and largely increases the possibility of ubiquitous surveillance.35 
One of the suggested concepts to prevent the end of privacy caused by big 
data is the concept of functional separation.36 The functional separation shall 
function as a safeguard to support regard to the individual data subjects 
concerned. Security of the data and all other necessary technical and organ-
isational  measures shall be implemented together with full or partial  an-
onymisation of the aggregated data.37 However, the functional  separation 
does not solve the obvious tension between the perception and the reality. 
Lack of effective ways to share information is observed, because the data 
protection and privacy legislation limits the degree to which an organisa-
tion can monitor its networks for the purpose of security. Functional separa-
tion would render big data analysis for the purpose of security almost use-
31 Kuner, C., Cate, F. H., Millard, C., Svantesson, D. J. B. 2012, ‘The challenge of ‘big data‘ for 
data protection‘, International Data Privacy Law, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 47-49. P. 48.
32 OECD. 1980, ‘OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Pes-
onal  Data‘,  viewed  22  December  2013,  http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm.
OECD.  2013,  ‘The  OECD  Privacy  Framework‘,  viewed  28  December  2013, 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf>. 
33 OECD 2013, p. 83.
34 KUNER 2012, p. 48.
35 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. 2013,  ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation‘, 
viewed 28 December 2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/document-
ation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp203_en.pdf>. P. 45.
36 Ibid. P. 30.
37 Ibid. 
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less, because the necessary information is often tied with a specific user ac-
count.38
As the security situation outside the cyberspace becomes more complic-
ated, new dangers for the data protection emerge. I believe that given the 
nature of threats, we are living in the world of a permanent low-intensity  
ubiquitous surveillance and it is a largely inevitable fact. In cyberspace, fa-
cing the advanced persistent threats, we might soon be faced to companies 
implementing  intelligence-driven  solutions.  Collecting  data  in  order  to 
model the standard behaviour of everyone in the system and in order to de-
tect irregularities that might constitute possible threats might soon become 
standard.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This comment is not meant to provide an exhaustive solution for the incom-
ing intelligence-driven security.  It wants to introduce the intelligence-driv-
en security to readers and provide them with an insight into possible prob-
lems with the implementation of this policy and with general data protec-
tion facing the future. I believe that the big data analysis brought the biggest 
challenge for the data protection and privacy so far, but at the same time, as 
mentioned above, it is also immensely useful in order to prevent advanced 
persistent threats from exploiting critical infrastructures or even societies. I 
argue that the low-intensity ubiquitous surveillance is extremely useful and 
therefore will be inevitable in the future.
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